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Liberal peace theories posit that peace among nations is not a result 
of a balance of power, but on the pacific nature of commonly held 
values, economic interdependence and mutual membership of 
international organisations. Ideal theories of the liberal peace can be 
traced back to the work of Immanuel Kant, who in his essay on the 
Perpetual Peace[1] argued that although war is the natural state of 
man, peace can be established through deliberate design. This 
requires the adoption of a republican constitution simultaneously by all 
nations, which inter alia would check the war-like tendencies of 
monarchs and the citizenry; the resultant cosmopolitanism that would 
emerge among the comity of nations would preclude war. The 
European Union is the most obvious, albeit imperfect, example. 
Mirroring Kant’s thoughts, is the contemporary philosopher, John 
Rawl’s[2] notion of peace between liberal societies, which he refers to 
as peoples and not states. He speaks of well-ordered peoples. These 
are mainly constitutional liberal democracies, which arrive at such a 
polity based on an idea of public reason. In a well ordered society 
based on public reason human rights are respected, and the 
distribution of primary goods (a decent living standard, dignity, respect 
and the ability to participate) for each citizen’s functioning are 
acceptably arranged. 
Another version of the liberal peace theory based on economic inter-
dependence is the ‘capitalist’ peace notion.[3] The intensity of 
international trade in an economy is the least important feature in the 
peace engendered by capitalism. The nature of advanced capitalism 
makes territorial disputes, which are mainly contests over resources, 
less likely as the market mechanism allows easier access to 
resources. The nature of production makes the output of more 
sophisticated goods and services increasingly reliant on ‘ideas’ that 
are research and development intensive, and the various stages of 
production occur across national boundaries. Moreover, the disruption 
to integrated financial markets makes war less likely between 
countries caught up in that web of inter-dependence. It is also argued 
that common foreign policy goals reflected in the membership of 
international treaty organisations (NATO, the European Union etc.) 
also produces peace. 
The chances of the well-ordered tolerant societies envisaged by 
Rawls living in peace within themselves and with one another have 
greatly diminished with the recent rise in inequality, the growing 
wealth and income share of the richest 1-10% of the population, and 
the rise in varieties of populism politics. Also, the quality of 
Kant’s foedus pacificum have been dealt a severe blow by nations 
such as the UK choosing to leave the European Union, adversely 
affecting the utilisation of soft power via common membership of 
international organisations. 
We also may have come to a stage where economic interactions such 
as the exchange of goods, provision of services and the movement of 
finance has become so internationalized that further increases in 
globalization cannot deliver greater prospects of peace.[4] But the 
logic of the capitalist peace still holds water; the intricate nature of the 
economic interdependence between advanced market economies, 
almost entirely rules out war, but other hostile attitudes can still 
persist, and even grow, given recent developments, including the rise 
in populist politics. 
The growth in inequality, but more especially the creeping rise in the 
social mobility inhibiting inequality of opportunity, has spawned the 
illiberal backlash manifesting itself in the rise in mainly right wing 
populist politics. A large segment of immiserized voters vote for 
populists knowing that once elected the populist politician is unlikely to 
increase their economic welfare, as long as they create discomfiture 
for certain establishment circles, vis-à-vis whom these voters see 
themselves as relatively deprived. Immigrants, and immigration is 
scapegoated and made responsible for all economic disadvantage 
and social evils following the simplistic and simple minded message of 
right-wing demagogues. It has to be said, that left-wing populism, too, 
has emerged in many societies, mainly among educated millennials 
whose economic prospects are often bleaker than those of their 
parents, and in regions (Latin America) with a strong Peronist 
tradition. 
By contrast, during the golden age, which lasted for a little over a 
quarter of a century after the Second World War, no particular group 
in society was disadvantaged by economic growth and the advance of 
capitalism. The elites appeared to internalize the interests of the 
median and below median income groups in society. Social mobility 
was palpably present, and social protection cushioned households 
against systemic and idiosyncratic economic shocks. The growth in 
inequality linked to globalization and labour saving technological 
progress since the early 1980s has disadvantaged vast swathes of 
the population: it first pauperized the former manufacturing production 
worker through either job offshore relocation or stagnating real wages, 
and latterly it is emasculating even median service sector 
occupations. At the same time the income and wealth share of the top 
1-10% of the population grows at an accelerating pace, faster than the 
rise in national income.[5]  This serves to exacerbate inequality even 
further as the ratio of wealth to national income rises, and virtually all 
wealth is concentrated in the hands of the top .-10% richest 
households. 
Faced with these challenges, we need to abandon our ‘Panglossian’ 
faith in the ability of markets to always do good. The rules of 
globalization and capitalism only serve elites who are owners of 
internationally mobile skills and wealth. There may be a hyper-
globalization trilemma[6], whereby the simultaneous achievement of 
national sovereignty, democracy and hyper-globalization is 
impossible. It is worth re-iterating that hyper-globalization refers to a 
situation where for the collective the pains from increased 
globalization in terms of adverse distributional consequences 
outweigh the gains in terms of enhanced income. 
Earlier advances of globalization was made relatively more 
acceptable in Europe compared to the United States, given the 
greater prevalence of social protection in the continent. Gradually, 
after 1980, and especially since the dawn of the new millennium more 
and more groups have been disadvantaged by globalization, and the 
politics of austerity has diminished social protection, fraying pre-
existing domestic social contracts. Thus, many advocate a more 
limited globalization, akin to the halcyon days of the golden age, also 
known as the Bretton Woods era (1945-73), whose hallmark was that 
the demands of globalization never exercised veto powers on the 
domestic social contract. 
A retreat from hyper-globalization is desirable, but not through 
channels that diminish international cooperation and partnership, like 
Brexit and President Trump’s protectionist sabre rattling that 
undermine agreements like NAFTA. What is needed is internationally 
coordinated checks on hyper-globalization, and agreements on 
certain wealth taxes on the richest individuals, which is required to 
address the alarming rise in wealth inequality given the fact that social 
protection can only have a palliative, and not curative, impact on 
these stupendous inequalities. 
In the UK developments such as Brexit will serve to strengthen the 
hand of autocratic tendencies that promote the hyper-globalization 
logic of minimal social and employment protection, with an even 
greater fraying of the post-war social contract. Politics and policy 
making risk becoming even more plutocratic without the restraining 
effect of the European Union. The foundations of the third pillar of the 
liberal peace, common membership of international organisations, will 
be seriously undermined, as will the use of soft power for Britain. Nor 
will there be greater gains in so-called trade negotiations with other 
economies of the world—the UK economy is too small to have 
anything approaching the bargaining power of the European Union. 
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